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Abstract. We describe the design and implementation of efficient sig-
nature and key-exchange schemes for the AVR ATmega and ARM Cor-
tex M0 microcontrollers, targeting the 128-bit security level. Our algo-
rithms are based on an efficient Montgomery ladder scalar multiplication
on the Kummer surface of Gaudry and Schost’s genus-2 hyperelliptic
curve, combined with the Jacobian point recovery technique of Costello,
Chung, and Smith. Our results are the first to show the feasibility of
software-only hyperelliptic cryptography on constrained platforms, and
represent a significant improvement on the elliptic-curve state-of-the-art
for both key exchange and signatures on these architectures. Notably, our
key-exchange scalar-multiplication software runs in under 9740k cycles
on the ATmega, and under 2650k cycles on the Cortex M0.
Keywords. Hyperelliptic curve cryptography, Kummer surface, AVR
ATmega, ARM Cortex M0.
1 Introduction
The current state of the art in asymmetric cryptography, not only on micro-
controllers, is elliptic-curve cryptography; the most widely accepted reasonable
security is the 128-bit security level. All current speed records for 128-bit se-
cure key exchange and signatures on microcontrollers are held—until now—by
elliptic-curve-based schemes. Outside the world of microcontrollers, it is well
known that genus-2 hyperelliptic curves and their Kummer surfaces present an
attractive alternative to elliptic curves. For example, the current speed record
for 128-bit-secure scalar multiplication on a range of architectures is held by
Kummer-based software presented at Asiacrypt 2014 by Bernstein, Chuengsa-
tiansup, Lange, and Schwabe [3]. These speed records were achieved by exploit-
ing the computational power of vector units of recent “large” processors such
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as Intel Sandy Bridge, Ivy Bridge, and Haswell, or the ARM Cortex-A8. Sur-
prisingly, very little attention has been given to Kummer surfaces on embedded
processors. Indeed, this is the first work showing the feasibility of software-only
implementations of hyperelliptic-curve based crypto on constrained platforms.
There have been some investigations of binary hyperelliptic curves targeting the
much lower 80-bit security level, but those are actually examples of software-
hardware co-design showing that using hardware acceleration for field operations
was necessary to get reasonable performance figures (see eg. [1] and [15]).
In this paper we investigate the potential of genus-2 hyperelliptic curves for
both key exchange and signatures on the “classical” 8-bit AVR ATmega architec-
ture, and the more modern 32-bit ARM Cortex-M0 processor. We show that not
only are hyperelliptic curves competitive, they clearly outperform state-of-the
art elliptic-curve schemes in terms of speed and size. For example, our variable-
basepoint scalar multiplication on a 127-bit Kummer surface is 31% faster on
AVR and 26% faster on the M0 than the recently presented speed records for
Curve25519 software by Düll, Haase, Hinterwälder, Hutter, Paar, Sánchez, and
Schwabe [10]; our implementation is also smaller, and requires less RAM.
We use a recent result by Costello, Chung, and Smith [9] to also set new speed
records for 128-bit secure signatures. Specifically, we present a new signature
scheme based on fast Kummer surface arithmetic. It is inspired by the EdDSA
construction by Bernstein, Duif, Lange, Schwabe, and Yang [4]. On the ATmega,
it produces shorter signatures, achieves higher speeds and needs less RAM than
the Ed25519 implementation presented in [21].
ATmega Cortex M0
Cycles Stack bytes Cycles Stack bytes
keygen 10 206 181 812 2 774 087 1 056
sign 10 404 033 926 2 865 351 1 360
verify 16 240 510 992 4 453 978 1 432
dh_exchange 9 739 059 429 2 644 604 584
Table 1. Cycle counts and stack usage in bytes of all functions related to the signature
and key exchange schemes, for the AVR ATmega and ARMCortex M0 microcontrollers.
Our routines handling secret data are constant-time, and are thus naturally
resistant to timing attacks. These algorithms are built around the Montgomery
ladder, which improves resistance against simple-power-analysis (SPA) attacks.
Resistance to DPA attacks can be easily obtained by randomizing the scalar
and/or Jacobian points. Re-randomizing the latter after each ladder step also
guarantees resistance against horizontal types of attacks.
Source code. We place all of the software described in this paper into the public
domain, to maximize reuseability of our results. The software is available at
http://www.cs.ru.nl/~jrenes/.
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2 High-level overview
We begin by describing the details of our signature and Diffie–Hellman schemes,
explaining the choices we made in their design. Concrete details on their im-
plementation appear in §3 and §4 below. Experimental results and comparisons
follow in §5.
2.1 Signatures
Our signature scheme adheres closely to the proposal of [9, §8], which in turn is
a type of Schnorr signature [24]. There are however some differences, and some
possible trade-offs, which we discuss below. The full scheme is presented at the
end of this section.
Group structure. We build the signature scheme on top of the group structure
from the Jacobian JC(Fq) of a genus-2 hyperelliptic curve C. More specifically, C
is the Gaudry–Schost curve over the prime field Fq with q = 2127 − 1 (cf. §3.2).
The Jacobian is a group of order #JC(Fq) = 24N , where
N = 2250 − 0x334D69820C75294D2C27FC9F9A154FF47730B4B840C05BD
is a 250-bit prime. For more details on the Jacobian and its elements, see §3.3.
Hash function. The hash function H can be any hash function with a 128-
bit security level. For our purposes, H(M) = SHAKE128(M, 512) suffices [11].
While SHAKE128 has variable-length output, we shall only use the 512-bit output
implementation.
Encoding. The objects on which we operate on the highest level are points Q
in JC(Fq). To minimize communication costs, we compress the common 508-
bit representation of Q into 256 bits (see §3.3). To avoid confusion between
compressed and uncompressed points, we let Q denote the 256-bit encoding
of Q. (This notation is the same as in [4].)
Public generator. The public generator can be any element P of JC(Fq) such
that [N ]P = 0. In our implementation we have made the arbitrary choice P =
(X2 + u1X + u0, v1X + v0), where
u1 = 0x7D5D9C3307E959BF27B8C76211D35E8A,
u0 = 0x2703150F9C594E0CA7E8302F93079CE8,
v1 = 0x444569AF177A9C1C721736D8F288C942,
v0 = 0x7F26CFB225F42417316836CFF8AEFB11.
This is the point which we use the most for scalar multiplication. Since it remains
fixed, we assume we have its decompressed representation precomputed, so as
to avoid having to perform the relatively expensive decompression operation
3
whenever we need a scalar multiplication; this gives a low-cost speed gain. We
further assume we have a “wrapped” representation of the projection of P to the
Kummer surface, which is used to speed up the xDBLADD function. See §4.1 for
more details on the xWRAP function.
Public keys. In contrast to the public generator, we assume public keys are
compressed: they are communicated much more frequently, and we therefore
benefit much more from smaller keys. Moreover, we include the public key in
one of the hashes during the sign operation [18,20], computing h = H(R||Q||M)
instead of the h = H(R||M) originally suggested by Schnorr [24]. This protects
against adversaries attacking multiple public keys simultaneously.
Compressed signatures. Schnorr [24] mentions the option of compressing signa-
tures by hashing one of their two components: the hash size only needs to be
b/2 bits, where b is the key length. Following this suggestion, our signatures are
384-bit values of the form (h128||s), where h128 means the lowest 128 bits of
h = H(R||Q||M), and s is a 256-bit scalar. The most obvious upside is that sig-
natures are smaller, reducing communication overhead. Another big advantage
is that we can exploit the half-size scalar to speed up signature verification. On
the other hand, we lose the possibility of efficient batch verification.
Verification efficiency. The most costly operation in signature verification is the
two-dimensional scalar multiplication T = [s]P ⊕ [h128]Q. In [9], the authors
propose an algorithm relying on the differential addition chains presented in [2].
However, since we are using compressed signatures, we have a small scalar h128.
To abuse this, we simply compute [s]P and [h128]Q separately using the fast
scalar multiplication on the Kummer surface and finally add them together on
the Jacobian. Not only do we need fewer cycles, but we can also reduce code size
by reusing the one-dimensional scalar multiplication routines.
The scheme. We now define our signature scheme, taking the remarks above
into account.
Key generation (keygen). Let d be a 256-bit secret key, and P the public
generator. Compute (d′||d′′) ← H(d) (with d′ and d′′ both 256 bits), then
Q← [16d′]P . The public key is Q.
Signing (sign). Let M be a message, d a 256-bit secret key, P the public gen-
erator, and Q a compressed public key. Compute (d′||d′′) ← H(d) (with
d′ and d′′ both 256 bits), then r ← H(d′′||M), then R ← [r]P , then h ←
H(R||Q||M), and finally s← (r − 16h128d′) mod N . The signature is (h128||s).
Verification (verify). Let M be a message with a signature (h128||s) corre-
sponding to a public key Q, and let P be the public generator. Compute
T ← [s]P ⊕ [h128]Q, then g ← H(T ||Q||M). The signature is correct if
g128 = h128, and incorrect otherwise.
Remark 1. We note that there may be other, faster algorithms to compute this
“one-and-a-half-dimensional” scalar multiplication. Since for verification we do
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not have to worry about being constant-time, one option might be to alter Mont-
gomery’s PRAC [26, §3.3.1] to make use of the half-size scalar. We have chosen
not to pursue this line, preferring the solid benefits of reduced code size instead.
2.2 Diffie-Hellman key exchange.
For key exchange it is not necessary to have a group structure; it is enough to
have a pseudo-multiplication. We can therefore carry out our the key exchange
directly on the Kummer surface KC = JC/〈±〉, gaining efficiency by not pro-
jecting from and recovering to the Jacobian JC . If Q is a point on JC , then its
image in KC is ±Q. The common representation for points in KC(Fq) is a 512-bit
4-tuple of field elements. For input points (i. e. the generator or public keys), we
prefer the 384-bit “wrapped” representation (see §3.5). This not only reduces key
size, but it also allows a speed-up in the core xDBLADD subroutine. The wrapped
representation of a point ±Q on KC is denoted by ±Q.
Key exchange (dh_exchange). Let d be a 256-bit secret key, and ±P the pub-
lic generator (respectively public key). Compute ±Q ← ±[d]P . The gener-
ated public key (respectively shared secret) is ±Q.
Remark 2. While it might be possible to reduce the key size even further to 256
bits, we would then have to pay the cost of compressing and decompressing,
and also wrapping for xDBLADD (see the discussion in [9, App. A]). We therefore
choose to keep the 384-bit representation, which is consistent with [3].
3 Building blocks: algorithms and their implementation
We begin by presenting the finite field F2127−1 in §3.1. We then define the curve
C in §3.2, before giving basic methods for the elements of JC in §3.3. We then
present the fast Kummer KC and its differential addition operations in §3.4.
3.1 The field Fq
We work over the prime finite field Fq, where q is the Mersenne prime
q := 2127 − 1 .
We letM, S, a, s, and neg denote the costs of multiplication, squaring, addition,
subtraction, and negation in Fq. Later, we will define a special operation for
multiplying by small constants: its cost is denoted by mc.
We can represent elements of Fq as 127-bit values; but since the ATmega and
Cortex M0 work with 8- and 32-bit words, respectively, the obvious choice is to
represent field elements with 128 bits. That is, an element g ∈ Fq is represented
as g =
∑15
i=0 gi2
8i on the AVR ATmega platform and as g =
∑3
i=0 g
′
i2
32i on the
Cortex M0, where gi ∈ {0, . . . , 28 − 1}, g′i ∈ {0, . . . , 232 − 1}.
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For complete field arithmetic we implement modular reduction, addition, sub-
traction, multiplication, and inversion. We comment on some important aspects
here, giving cycle counts in Table 2.
Working with the prime field Fq, we need integer reduction modulo q; this is
implemented as bigint_red. Reduction is very efficient because 2128 ≡ 2 mod q,
which enables us to reduce using only shifts and integer additions. Given this
reduction, we implement addition and subtraction operations for Fq (as gfe_add
and gfe_sub, respectively) in the obvious way.
The most costly operations in Fq are multiplication (gfe_mul) and squar-
ing (gfe_sqr), which are implemented as 128 × 128-bit bit integer operations
(bigint_mul and bigint_sqrt) followed by a call to bigint_red. Since we are
working on the same platforms as in [10] in which both of these operations are
already highly optimized, we chose to take the necessary code for bigint_mul
and bigint_sqr from those implementations:
– On the AVR ATmega: The authors of [17] implement a 3-level Karatsuba
multiplication of two 256-bit integers, representing elements f of F2255−19 as
f =
∑31
i=0 fi2
8i with fi ∈ {0, . . . , 28 − 1}. Since the first level of Karatsuba
relies on a 128 × 128-bit integer multiplication routine named MUL128, we
simply lift this function out to form a 2-level 128× 128-bit Karatsuba mul-
tiplication. Similarly, their 256 × 256-bit squaring relies on a 128 × 128-bit
routine SQR128, which we can (almost) directly use. Since the 256× 256-bit
squaring is 2-level Karatsuba, the 128×128-bit squaring is 1-level Karatsuba.
– On the ARM Cortex M0: The authors of [10] make use of optimized Karat-
suba multiplication and squaring. In this case their assembly code does not
rely on subroutines, but fully inlines 128× 128-bit multiplication and squar-
ing. The 256×256-bit multiplication and squaring are both 3-level Karatsuba
implementations. Hence, using these, we end up with 2-level 128 × 128-bit
Karatsuba multiplication and squaring.
The function gfe_invert computes inversions in Fq as exponentiations, using
the fact that g−1 = gq−2 for all g in F×q . To do this efficiently we use an addition
chain for q − 2, doing the exponentiation in 10M+ 126S.
Finally, to speed up our Jacobian point decompression algorithms, we define
a function gfe_powminhalf which computes g 7→ g−1/2 for g in Fq (up to a
choice of sign). To do this, we note that g−1/2 = ±g−(q+1)/4 = ±g(3q−5)/4 in Fq;
this exponentiation can be done with an addition chain of length 136, using
11M+125S. We can then define a function gfe_sqrtinv, which given (x, y) and
a bit b, computes (
√
x, 1/y) as (±xyz, xyz2) where z = gfe_powminhalf(xy2),
choosing the sign so that the square root has least significant bit b. Including
the gfe_powminhalf call, this costs 15M + 126S + 1neg.
3.2 The curve C and its theta constants
We define the curve C “backwards”, starting from its (squared) theta constants
a := −11 , b := 22 , c := 19 , and d := 3 in Fq .
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AVR ATmega ARM Cortex M0 Symbolic cost
bigint_mul 1 654 410
bigint_sqr 1 171 260
bigint_red 438 71
gfe_mul 1 952 502 M
gfe_sqr 1469 353 S
gfe_mulconst 569 83 mc
gfe_add 400 62 a
gfe_sub 401 66 s
gfe_invert 169 881 46 091 I
gfe_powminhalf 169 881 46 294 11M+ 125S
gfe_sqrtinv 178 041 48 593 15M+ 126S+ 1neg
Table 2. Cycle counts for our field arithmetic implementation (including function-call
overhead).
From these, we define the dual theta constants
A := a+ b+ c+ d = 33 , B := a+ b− c− d = −11 ,
C := a− b+ c− d = −17 , D := a− b− c+ d = −49 .
Observe that projectively,
(
1
a
:
1
b
:
1
c
:
1
d
) = (114 : −57 : −66 : −418)
and
(
1
A
:
1
B
:
1
C
:
1
D
) = (−833 : 2499 : 1617 : 561) .
Crucially, all of these constants can be represented using just 16 bits. Since
Kummer arithmetic involves many multiplications by these constants, we im-
plement a separate 16× 128-bit multiplication function gfe_mulconst. For the
AVR ATmega, we store the constants in two 8-bit registers. For the Cortex M0,
the values fit into a halfword; this works well with the 16×16-bit multiplication.
Multiplication by any of these 16-bit constants costs mc.
Continuing, we define e/f := (1 + α)/(1− α), where α2 = CD/AB (we take
the square root with least significant bit 0), and thus
λ := ac/bd = 0x15555555555555555555555555555552 ,
µ := ce/df = 0x73E334FBB315130E05A505C31919A746 ,
ν := ae/bf = 0x552AB1B63BF799716B5806482D2D21F3 .
These are the Rosenhain invariants of the curve C, found by Gaudry and Schost [13],
which we are (finally!) ready to define as
C : Y 2 = fC(X) := X(X − 1)(X − λ)(X − µ)(X − ν) .
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The curve constants are the coefficients of fC(X) =
∑5
i=0 fiX
i: so f0 = 0, f5 = 1,
f1 = 0x1EDD6EE48E0C2F16F537CD791E4A8D6E ,
f2 = 0x73E799E36D9FCC210C9CD1B164C39A35 ,
f3 = 0x4B9E333F48B6069CC47DC236188DF6E8 ,
f4 = 0x219CC3F8BB9DFE2B39AD9E9F6463E172 .
We store the squared theta constants (a : b : c : d), along with (1/a : 1/b :
1/c : 1/d), and (1/A : 1/B : 1/C : 1/D); the Rosenhain invariants λ, µ, and ν,
together with λµ and λν; and the curve constants f1, f2, f3, and f4, for use in our
Kummer and Jacobian arithmetic functions. Obviously, none of the Rosenhain
or curve constants are small; multiplying by these costs a full M.
3.3 Elements of JC, compressed and decompressed.
Our algorithms use the usual Mumford representation for elements of JC(Fq):
they correspond to pairs 〈u(X), v(X)〉, where u and v are polynomials over Fq
with u monic, deg v < deg u ≤ 2, and v(X)2 ≡ fC(X) (mod u(X)). We compute
the group operation ⊕ in JC(Fq) using a function ADD, which implements the al-
gorithm found in [14] (after a change of coordinates to meet their Assumption 1)3
at a cost of 28M + 2S + 11a + 24s + 1I.
For transmission, we compress the 508-bit Mumford representation to a 256-
bit form. Our functions compress (Algorithm 1) and decompress (Algorithm 2)
implement Stahlke’s compression technique (see [25] and [9, App. A] for details).
Algorithm 1: compress: compresses points on JC to 256-bit strings. Sym-
bolic cost: 3M + 1S + 2a + 2s. ATmega: 8 016 cycles. Cortex M0: 2 186
cycles.
Input:
〈
X2 + u1X + u0, v1X + v0
〉
= P ∈ JC .
Output: A string b0 · · · b255 of 256 bits.
1 w← 4((u1 · v0 − u0 · v1) · v1 − v20) // 3M + 1S + 2a + 2s
2 b0 ← LeastSignificantBit(v1)
3 b128 ← LeastSignificantBit(w)
4 return b0||u0||b128||u1
3.4 The Kummer surface KC
The Kummer surface of C is the quotient KC := JC/〈±1〉; points on KC corre-
spond to points on JC taken up to sign. If P is a point in JC , then we write
(xP : yP : zP : tP ) = ±P
3 We only call ADD once in our algorithms, so for lack of space we omit its description.
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Algorithm 2: decompress: decompresses 256-bit string to a point on JC .
Symbolic cost: 46M + 255S + 17a + 12s + 6neg. ATmega: 386 524 cycles
Cortex M0: 106 013 cycles
Input: A string b0 · · · b255 of 256 bits.
Output:
〈
X2 + u1X + u0, v1X + v0
〉
= P ∈ JC .
1 U1 = b129 · · · b256 as an element of Fq
2 U0 = b1 · · · b127 as an element of Fq
3 T1 ← U21 // 1S
4 T2 ← U0 − T1 // 1s
5 T3 ← U0 + T2 // 1a
6 T4 ← U0 · (T3 · f4 + (U1 · f3 − 2f2)) // 3M + 1a + 2s
7 T3 ← −T3 // 1neg
8 T1 ← T3 − U0 // 1s
9 T4 ← 2(T4 + (T1 · U0 + f1) · U1) // 2M + 3a
10 T1 ← 2(T1 − U0)) // 1a + 1s
11 T5 ← ((U0 − (f3 + U1 · (U1 − f4))) · U0 + f1)2 // 2M + 1S + 2a + 2s
12 T5 ← T24 − 2T5 · T1 // 1M + 1S + 1a + 1s
13 (T6,T5)← gfe_sqrtinv(T5,T1, b1) // 19M + 127S + 2neg
14 T4 ← (T5 − T4) · T6 // 1M + 1s
15 T5 ← −f4 · T2 − ((T3 − f3) · U1) + f2 + T4 // 2M + 2s + 2a + 1neg
16 T6 = gfe_powminhalf(4T6) // = 1/(2v1). 11M + 125S + 2a
17 V1 ← 2T5 · T6 // 1M + 1a
18 if b0 6= LeastSignificantBit(V1) then (V1,T6)← (−V1,−T6) // 2neg
19 T5 ← (U1 · f4 + (T2 − f3)) · U0 // 2M + 1a + 1s
20 V0 ← (U1 · T4 + T5 + f1) · T6 // 2M + 2a
21 return
〈
X2 + U1X + U0,V1X + V0
〉
for its image in KC . To avoid subscript explosion, we make the following conven-
tion: when points P and Q on JC are clear from the context, we write
(x⊕ : y⊕ : z⊕ : t⊕) = ±(P ⊕Q) and (x	 : y	 : z	 : t	) = ±(P 	Q) .
The Kummer surface of this C has a “fast” model in P3 defined by
KC : E · xyzt =
(
(x2 + y2 + z2 + t2)
−F · (xt+ yz)−G · (xz + yt)−H · (xy + zt)
)2
where
F =
a2 − b2 − c2 + d2
ad− bc , G =
a2 − b2 + c2 − d2
ac− bd , H =
a2 + b2 − c2 − d2
ab− cd ,
and E = 4abcd (ABCD/((ad− bc)(ac− bd)(ab− cd)))2 (see eg. [7], [8], and [12]).
The identity point 〈1, 0〉 of JC maps to
±0JC = (a : b : c : d) .
Algorithm 3 (Project) projects general points from JC(Fq) into KC . The “spe-
cial” case, where u is linear, is treated in [9, §7.2].
Algorithm 3: Project: JC → KC . Symbolic cost: 8M + 1S + 4mc + 7a
+ 4s. ATmega: 20 205 cycles. Cortex M0: 5 667 cycles.
Input:
〈
X2 + u1X + u0, v1X + v0
〉
= P ∈ JC .
Output: (xP : yP : zP : tP ) = ±P ∈ KC .
1 (T1,T2,T3,T4)← (µ− u0, λν − u0, ν − u0, λµ− u0) // 4s
2 T5 ← λ+ u1 // 1a
3 T7 ← u0 · ((T5 + µ) · T3) // 2M + 1a
4 T5 ← u0 · ((T5 + ν) · T1) // 2M + 1a
5 (T6,T8)← (u0 · ((µ+ u1) · T2 + T2), u0 · ((ν + u1) · T4 + T4)) // 4M + 4a
6 T1 ← v20 // 1S
7 (T5,T6,T7,T8)← (T5 − T1,T6 − T1,T7 − T1,T8 − T1) // 4s
8 return (a · T5 : b · T6 : c · T7 : d · T8) // 4mc
3.5 Pseudo-addition on KC.
While the points of KC do not form a group, we have a pseudo-addition operation
(differential addition), which computes ±(P ⊕Q) from ±P , ±Q, and ±(P 	Q).
The function xADD (Algorithm 4) implements the standard differential addition.
The special case where P = Q yields a pseudo-doubling operation.
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To simplify the presentation of our algorithms, we define three operations on
points in P3. First,M : P3 × P3 → P3 multiplies the corresponding coordinates
of a pair of points:
M : ((x1 : y1 : z1 : t1), (x2 : y2 : z2 : t2)) 7−→ (x1x2 : y1y2 : z1z2 : t1t2) .
The special case (x1 : y1 : z1 : t1) = (x2 : y2 : z2 : t2) is denoted by
S : (x : y : z : t) 7−→ (x2 : y2 : z2 : t2) .
Finally, the Hadamard transform4 is defined by
H : (x : y : z : t) 7−→ (x′ : y′ : z′ : t′) where

x′ = x+ y + z + t ,
y′ = x+ y − z − t ,
z′ = x− y + z − t ,
t′ = x− y − z + t .
ClearlyM and S, cost 4M and 4S, respectively. The Hadamard transform can
easily be implemented with 4a+4s. However, the additions and subtractions are
relatively cheap, making function call overhead a large factor. To minimize this
we inline the Hadamard transform, trading a bit of code size for efficiency.
Algorithm 4: xADD: Differential addition on KC . Symbolic cost: 14M +
4S+ 4mc + 12a+ 12s. ATmega: 34 774 cycles. Cortex M0: 9 598 cycles.
Input: (±P,±Q,±(P 	Q)) ∈ K3C for some P and Q on JC .
Output: ±(P ⊕Q) ∈ KC .
1 (V1,V2)← (H(±P ),H(±Q)) // 8a + 8s
2 V1 ←M(V1,V2) // 4M
3 V1 ←M(V1, (1/A : 1/B : 1/C : 1/D)) // 4mc
4 V1 ← H(V1) // 4a + 4s
5 V1 ← S(V1) // 4S
6 (C1,C2)← (z	 · t	, x	 · y	) // 2M
7 V2 ←M((C1 : C1 : C2 : C2), (y	 : x	 : t	 : z	)) // 4M
8 returnM(V1,V2) // 4M
Lines 5 and 6 of Algorithm 4 only involve the third argument, ±(P 	 Q);
essentially, they compute the point (y	z	t	 : x	z	t	 : x	y	t	 : x	y	z	)
(which is projectively equivalent to (1/x	 : 1/y	 : 1/z	 : 1/t	), but requires
no inversions; note that this is generally not a point on KC). In practice, the
pseudoadditions used in our scalar multiplication all use a fixed third argument,
so it makes sense to precompute this “inverted” point and to scale it by x	 so
that the first coordinate is 1, thus saving 7M in each subsequent differential
4 Observe that (A : B : C : D) = H((a : b : c : d)) and, dually, (a : b : c : d) = H((A :
B : C : D)).
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addition for a one-off cost of 1I. The resulting data can be stored as the 3-tuple
(x	/y	, x	/z	, x	/t	), ignoring the trivial first coordinate: this is the wrapped
form of ±(P	Q). The function xWRAP (Algorithm 5) applies this transformation.
Algorithm 5: xWRAP: (x : y : z : t) 7→ (x/y, x/z, x/t). Symbolic cost: 7M
+ 1I ATmega: 182 251 cycles. Cortex M0: 49 609 cycles.
Input: (x : y : z : t) ∈ P3
Output: (x/y, x/z, x/t) ∈ F3q.
1 V1 ← y · z // 1M
2 V2 ← x/(V1 · t) // 2M + 1I
3 V3 ← V2 · t // 1M
4 return (V3 · z,V3 · y,V1 · V2) // 3M
Algorithm 6 combines the pseudo-doubling with the differential addition,
sharing intermediate operands, to define a differential double-and-add xDBLADD.
This is the fundamental building block of the Montgomery ladder.
Algorithm 6: xDBLADD: Combined differential double-and-add. The dif-
ference point is wrapped. Symbolic cost: 7M + 12S + 12mc + 16a + 16s.
ATmega: 36 706 cycles. Cortex M0: 9 861 cycles.
Input: (±P,±Q, (x	/y	, x	/z	, x	/t	)) ∈ K2C × Fq.
Output: (±[2]P,±(P ⊕Q)) ∈ K2C .
1 (V1,V2)← (S(±P ),S(±Q)) // 8S
2 (V1,V2)← (H(V1),H(V2)) // 8a + 8s
3 (V1,V2)← (S(V1),M(V1,V2)) // 4M+4S
4 (V1,V2)←
(M(V1, ( 1A : 1B : 1C : 1D )),M(V2, ( 1A : 1B : 1C : 1D ))) // 8mc
5 (V1,V2)← (H(V1),H(V2)) // 8a + 8s
6 return (M(V1, ( 1a : 1b : 1c : 1d )),M(V2, (1 :
x	
y	 :
x	
y	 :
x	
t	 ))) // 3M + 4mc
4 Scalar multiplication
All of our cryptographic routines are built around scalar multiplication in JC and
pseudo-scalar multiplication in KC . We implement pseudo-scalar multiplication
using the classic Montgomery ladder in §4.1. In §4.2, we extend this to full scalar
multiplication on JC using the point recovery technique proposed in [9].
4.1 Pseudomultiplication on KC
Since [m](	P ) = 	[m]P for all m and P , we have a pseudo-scalar multiplication
operation (m,±P ) 7−→ ±[m]P on KC , which we compute using Algorithm 7
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M S mc a s neg I ATmega Cortex M0
ADD 28 2 0 11 24 0 1 228 552 62 886
Project 8 1 4 7 8 0 0 20 205 5 667
xWRAP 7 0 0 0 0 0 1 182 251 49 609
xUNWRAP 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 297 2 027
xADD 14 4 4 12 12 0 0 34 774 9 598
xDBLADD 7 12 12 16 16 0 0 36 706 9 861
recoverGeneral 77 8 0 19 10 3 1 318 910 88 414
fast2genPartial 11 0 0 9 0 0 0 21 339 6 110
fast2genFull 15 0 0 12 0 0 0 29 011 8 333
recoverFast 139 12 4 70 22 5 1 447 176 124 936
compress 3 1 0 2 2 0 0 8 016 2 186
decompress 46 255 0 17 12 6 0 386 524 106 013
Table 3. Operation and cycle counts of basic functions on the Kummer and Jacobian.
(the Montgomery ladder), implemented as crypto_scalarmult. The loop of
Algorithm 7 maintains the following invariant: at the end of iteration i we have
(V1, V2) = (±[k]P,±[k + 1]P ) where k =
∑β−1
j=i mj2
β−1−i .
Hence, at the end we return ±[m]P , and also ±[m+1]P as a (free) byproduct. We
assume that we have a constant-time conditional swap routine CSWAP(b, (V1, V2)),
which returns (V1, V2) if b = 0 and (V2, V1) if b = 1. This makes the execution of
Algorithm 7 uniform and constant-time, which means it is suitable for use with
secret values of m.
Algorithm 7: crypto_scalarmult: Montgomery ladder on KC . Uniform
and constant-time: may be used for secret scalars. The point is wrapped.
Symbolic cost: (4+7β)M+12βS+12βmc+16βa+16βs, where β = scalar
bitlength. ATmega: 9 513 536 cycles. Cortex: 2 633 662 cycles.
Input: (m =
∑β−1
i=0 mi2
i, (xP /yP , xP /zP , xP /tP )) ∈ [0, 2β)× F3q for ±P in KC .
Output: (±[m]P,±[m+ 1]P ) ∈ K2C .
1 V1 ← (a : b : c : d)
2 V2 ← xUNWRAP(xP /yP , xP /zP , xP /tP ) // = ±P. 4M
3 for i = 250 down to 0 do // 7βM + 12βS + 12βmc + 16βa + 16βs
4 (V1,V2)← CSWAP(mi, (V1,V2))
5 (V1,V2)← xDBLADD(V1,V2, (xP /yP , xP /zP , xP /tP ))
6 (V1,V2)← CSWAP(mi, (V1,V2))
7 return (V1,V2)
Our implementation of crypto_scalarmult assumes that its input Kum-
mer point ±P is wrapped. This follows the approach of [3]. Indeed, many calls
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to crypto_scalarmult involve Kummer points that are stored or transmitted
in wrapped form. However, crypto_scalarmult does require the unwrapped
point internally—if only to initialize one variable. We therefore define a function
xUNWRAP (Algorithm 8) to invert the xWRAP transformation at a cost of only 4M.
Algorithm 8: xUNWRAP: (x/y, x/z, x/t) 7→ (x : y : z : t). Symbolic cost:
4M. ATmega: 7 297 cycles. Cortex: 2 027 cycles.
Input: (u, v, w) ∈ F3q s.t. u = xP /yP , v = xP /zP , w = xP /tP for ±P ∈ KC
Output: (xP : yP : zP : tP ) ∈ P3
1 (T1,T2,T3)← (v · w, u · w, u · v) // 3M
2 return (T3 · w : T1 : T2 : T3) // 1M
4.2 Point recovery from KC to JC
Point recovery means efficiently computing [m]P on JC given ±[m]P on KC and
some additional information. In our case, the additional information is the base
point P and the second output of the Montgomery ladder, ±[m+ 1]P .
Algorithm 9 (Recover) implements the point recovery algorithm described
in [9]. This is the genus-2 analogue of the point recovery methods defined for
elliptic curves in [19], [22], and [5].
Algorithm 9: Recover: From KC to JC . Symbolic cost: 139M + 12S +
4mc + 70a + 22s + 3neg + 1I. ATmega: 447 176 cycles. Cortex: 124 936
cycles.
Input: (P,±P,±Q,±(P ⊕Q)) ∈ JC ×K3C for some P,Q in JC .
Output: Q ∈ JC .
1 gP← fast2genPartial(±P ) // 11M + 9a
2 gQ← fast2genFull(±Q) // 15M + 12a
3 gS← fast2genPartial(±(P ⊕Q)) // 11M + 9a
4 xD← xADD(±P,±Q,±(P ⊕Q)) // 14M + 4S + 4m_c + 12a + 12s
5 gD← fast2genPartial(xD) // 11M + 9a
6 return recoverGeneral(P, gP, gQ, gS, gD) // 77M+8S+19a+10s+3neg+1I
While we refer the reader to [9] for technical details on this method, and
proof of its correctness, there is one important mathematical detail that we
should mention, since it is reflected in the structure of our code. Namely, point
recovery is more naturally computed starting from the general Flynn model K˜C
of the Kummer, because it is more closely related to the Mumford model for JC .
Algorithm 9 therefore proceeds in two steps: first we map the problem onto K˜C
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using Algorithms 10 and 11 (fast2genFull and fast2genPartial), and then
we recover from K˜C to JC using Algorithm 12 (recoverGeneral).
Since the general Kummer K˜C only appears briefly in our recovery procedure
(we never use its relatively slow arithmetic operations), we will not investigate it
any further here—but the curious reader may refer to [6] for the general theory.
For our purposes, it suffices to recall that K˜C is, like KC , embedded in P3; and the
isomorphism KC → K˜C is defined (in eg. [9, §7.4]) by the linear transformation
(xP : yP : zP : tP ) 7−→ (x˜P : y˜P : z˜P : t˜P ) := (xP : yP : zP : tP )L ,
where L is (any scalar multiple of) the matrix
a−1(ν − λ) a−1(µν − λ) a−1λν(µ− 1) a−1λν(µν − λ)
b−1(µ− 1) b−1(µν − λ) b−1µ(ν − λ) b−1µ(µν − λ)
c−1(λ− µ) c−1(λ− µν) c−1λµ(1− ν) c−1λµ(λ− µν)
d−1(1− ν) d−1(λ− µν) d−1ν(λ− µ) d−1ν(λ− µν)
 ,
which we precompute and store. If ±P is a point on KC , then ±˜P denotes its
image on K˜C ; we compute ±˜P using Algorithm 10 (fast2genFull).
Algorithm 10: fast2genFull: The map KC → K˜C . Symbolic cost: 15M+
12a. ATmega: 29 011 cycles. Cortex: 8 333 cycles.
Input: ±P ∈ KC
Output: ±˜P ∈ K˜C .
1 x˜P ← xP + (L12/L11)yP + (L13/L11)zP + (L14/L11)tP // 3M+ 3a
2 y˜P ← (L21/L11)xP + (L22/L11)yP + (L23/L11)zP + (L24/L11)tP // 4M+ 3a
3 z˜P ← (L31/L11)xP + (L32/L11)yP + (L33/L11)zP + (L34/L11)tP // 4M+ 3a
4 t˜P ← (L41/L11)xP + (L42/L11)yP + (L43/L11)zP + (L44/L11)tP // 4M+ 3a
5 return (x˜P : y˜P : z˜P : t˜P )
Sometimes we only require the first three coordinates of ±˜P . Algorithm 11
(fast2genPartial) saves 4M+ 3a per point by not computing t˜P .
4.3 Full scalar multiplication on JC
We now combine our pseudo-scalar multiplication function crypto_scalarmult
with the point-recovery function Recover to define a full scalar multiplication
function jacobian_scalarmult (Algorithm 13) on JC .
Remark 3. We have designed jacobian_scalarmult to take not only a scalar m
and a Jacobian point P in its Mumford representation, but also the wrapped
form of ±P as an auxiliary argument: that is, we assume that xP← Project(P )
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Algorithm 11: fast2genPartial: The map KC → P2. Symbolic cost:
11M+ 9a. ATmega: 21 339 cycles. Cortex: 8 333 cycles.
Input: ±P ∈ KC .
Output: (x˜P : y˜P : z˜P ) ∈ P2
1 x˜P ← xP + (L12/L11)yP + (L13/L11)zP + (L14/L11)tP // 3M+ 3a
2 y˜P ← (L21/L11)xP + (L22/L11)yP + (L23/L11)zP + (L24/L11)tP // 4M+ 3a
3 z˜P ← (L31/L11)xP + (L32/L11)yP + (L33/L11)zP + (L34/L11)tP // 4M+ 3a
4 return (x˜P : y˜P : z˜P )
Algorithm 12: recoverGeneral: From K˜C to JC . Symbolic cost: 77M+
8S+19a+10s+3neg+1I. ATmega: 318 910 cycles. Cortex: 88 414 cycles.
Input: (P, ±˜P , ±˜Q, ˜±(P⊕Q), ˜±(P	Q)) ∈ JC × K˜4C for some P and Q in JC .
The values of t˜P , t˜⊕, and t˜	 are not required.
Output: Q ∈ JC .
1 (Z1,Z2)← (y˜P · x˜Q − x˜Q · y˜P , x˜P · z˜Q − z˜P · x˜Q) // 4M+2s
2 T1← Z1 · z˜P // 1M
3 mZ3← Z2 · y˜P + T1 // 1M + 1a
4 D← Z22 · x˜P +mZ3 · Z1 // 2M + 1S + 1a
5 T2← Z1 · Z2 // 1M
6 T3← x˜P · x˜Q // 1M
7 E← T3 · (T3 · (f2 · Z22 − f1 · T2) + t˜Q · D) // 5M + 1S + 1a + 1s
8 E← E+mZ3 · x˜2Q · (f3 · Z2 · x˜P + f4 ·mZ3) // 5M + 1S + 2a
9 E← E+mZ3 · x˜Q · (mZ3 · y˜Q − Z2 · x˜P · z˜Q) // 5M + 1a + 1s
10 X1← x˜P · (Z2 · v1(P )− Z1 · v0(P )) // 3M + 1s
11 T4← Z1 · y˜P + Z2 · x˜P // 2M + 1a
12 X2← T1 · v1(P ) + T4 · v0(P ) // 2M + 1a
13 C5← Z12 − T4 · x˜Q // 1M + 1S + 1s
14 C6← T1 · x˜Q + T2 // 1M + 1a
15 T5← z˜⊕ · x˜	 − x˜⊕ · z˜	 // 2M + 1s
16 X3← X1 · T5− X2 · (x˜⊕ · y˜	 − y˜⊕ · x˜	) // 4M + 2s
17 (X5,X6)← (X3 · C5,X3 · C6) // 2M
18 X4← T3 · (X1 · (z˜⊕ · y˜	 − y˜⊕ · z˜	) + T5 · X2) // 5M + 1a + 1s
19 (X7,X8)← (X5+ Z1 · X4,X6+ Z2 · Z4) // 2M + 2a
20 T6← x˜⊕ · x˜	 // 1M
21 E← −T6 · T3 · (E · x˜2P + (X1 · T3)2) // 5M + 2S + 1a + 1neg
22 (X9,X10)← (E · X7,E · X8) // 2M
23 F← X2 · (x˜⊕ · y˜	 + y˜⊕ · x˜	) + X1 · (z˜⊕ · x˜	 + x˜⊕ · z˜	) // 6M + 3a
24 F← X1 · F+ 2(X22 · T6) // 2M + 1S + 2a
25 F← −2(F · D · T6 · T3 · T32 · x˜P ) // 5M + 1S + 1a + 1neg
26 (U1,U0)← (−F · y˜Q,F · z˜Q) // 2M + 1neg
27 Fi← 1/(F · x˜Q) // 1M + 1I
28 (u′1, u
′
0, v
′
1, v
′
0)← (Fi · U1,Fi · U0,Fi · X9,Fi · X10) // 4M
29 return
〈
X2 + u′1X + u
′
0, v
′
1X + v
′
0
〉
Algorithm 13: jacobian_scalarmult: Scalar multiplication on JC , using
the Montgomery ladder on KC and recovery to JC . Assumes wrapped pro-
jected point as auxiliary input. Symbolic cost: (7β+143)M+(12β+12)S+
(12β + 4)mc + (70 + 16β)a + (22 + 16β)s + 3neg + I. ATmega: 9 968 127
cycles. Cortex: 2 709 401 cycles.
Input: (m,P, (xP /yP , xP /zP , xP /tP )) ∈ [0, 2β)× JC
Output: [m]P ∈ JC
1 (X0,X1)← crypto_scalarmult(m, (xP /yP , xP /zP , xP /tP ))
// (7β + 4)M+12βS+12βmc+16βa+16βs
2 xP← xUNWRAP((xP /yP , xP /zP , xP /tP )) // 4M
3 return Recover(P, xP,X0,X1) // 139M+12S+4mc+70a+22s+3neg+1I
and xWRAP(xP) have already been carried out as a precomputation. This saves re-
dundant Projecting and xWRAPping when we are operating on fixed base points,
as is often the case in our protocols. Nevertheless, jacobian_scalarmult could
easily be converted to a “pure” Jacobian scalar multiplication function (with no
auxiliary input) by inserting appropriate Project and xWRAP calls at the start,
and removing the xUNWRAP call at Line 2. These modifications would increase
the cost of jacobian_scalarmult by 11M + 1S + 4mc + 7a + 8s + 1I.
5 Results and comparison
The high-level cryptographic functions for our signature scheme are named
keygen, sign and verify. Their implementations contain no surprises: they
do exactly what what was specified in §2.1, calling the lower-level functions
described in §3 and §4 as required. Our key exchange uses only the function
dh_exchange, for both Diffie-Hellman key generation and key exchange. It im-
plements exactly what we specified in §2.2: it is a call to crypto_scalarmult
plus a call to xWRAP to convert to the correct 384-bit representation. Table 1
(in the introduction) presents the cycle counts and stack usage for all of our
high-level functions.
5.1 Code and compilation
In our experiments, the code for the AVR ATmega was compiled with avr-gcc
at optimization level -O2. The ARM Cortex M0 code uses the clang compiler,
also with optimization level -O2. We experimented with different optimization
levels (-O3, -O1, and -Os), but the results were fairly similar. The total size of
the program is 20 242 bytes for the AVR ATmega, and 19 606 bytes for the ARM
Cortex M0. This consists of the full signature and key-exchange code, including
the hash function SHAKE128 implemented with fixed 512-bit output, with the
code taken from the reference implementation.5
5 We used the reference C implementation for the Cortex M0, and the assembly imple-
mentation for AVR; both are available on http://keccak.noekeon.org/. The only
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5.2 Comparison
As we believe ours to be the first genus-2 hyperelliptic curve implementation on
both the AVR ATmega and the ARM Cortex M0 architectures, it is difficult to
make a comparison. On the other hand, we may compare with elliptic curve-
based alternatives at the same 128-bit security level: notably [28], [16], [27],
and [10].
If one is only interested in a key exchange scheme, it is enough to have
an object which merely has a differential addition. A well-known example is
the Montgomery model for elliptic curves, with very efficient x-coordinate-only
arithmetic, which was used in eg. [28], [16], and [10] to obtain efficient Diffie–
Hellman key exchange. It is also possible to use x-only arithmetic on Weierstrass
curves, as we see in [27] (which is based on the pseudo-addition presented in [5]).
In genus 2, Kummer surfaces have similar properties. Although they only have a
pseudo-addition, it is very efficient and therefore highly suitable for key exchange.
If one also wants to implement signatures, differential addition is no longer
sufficient. In this case, one has to work with points in an elliptic curve group
(or the Jacobian of a genus 2 curve). To still make use of the efficient x-only
arithmetic, one must project a point (x, y) to the x-only representation, do a
pseudo-scalar multiplication, and then recover the correct y-coordinate of the
result. (This is done in [27] using a Weierstrass curve.) As recovery is generally
quite slow, this imposes non-negligible overhead.
In genus 2 we can use a completely analogous technique: we project points
from the Jacobian to the Kummer surface, use its efficient arithmetic for the
scalar multiplication, and recover the correct element of the Jacobian. As in the
elliptic case, this does impose some overhead. We therefore only do this when
really necessary: that is, for signatures. When computing shared secrets in key
exchange, we remain on the Kummer surface.
Implementation Object Clock cycles Code size Stack
S,DH Wenger et al. [27] NIST P-256 ≈ 10 730 000 7 168 bytes 540 bytes
DH Düll et al. [10] Curve25519 3 589 850 7 900 bytes 548 bytes
DH This work KC 2 633 662 ≈ 4 328 bytes 248 bytes
S This work JC 2 709 401 ≈ 9 874 bytes 968 bytes
Table 4. Comparison of scalar multiplication routines on the ARM Cortex M0 archi-
tecture at the 128-bit security level. S denotes signature-compatible full scalar multi-
plication; DH denotes Diffie–Hellman pseudo-scalar multiplication.
As we see in Table 4, genus-2 techniques give great results for Diffie–Hellman
key exchange on the ARM Cortex M0 architecture. Comparing with the current
fastest implementation [10], we reduce the number of clock cycles by about 27%,
change required is to the padding, which must take domain separation into account
according to [11, p.28].
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while about halving code size and stack usage. For signatures, the state-of-the-art
is [27]: here we reduce the cycle count for the underlying scalar multiplications
by a very impressive 75%, at the cost of a moderate increase in code size and
stack usage.
Implementation Object Cycles Code size Stack
DH Liu et al. [28] 256-bit curve ≈ 21 078 200 14 700 bytes∗ 556 bytes
S,DH Wenger et al. [27] NIST P-256 ≈ 34 930 000 16 112 bytes 590 bytes
DH Hutter, Schwabe [16] Curve25519 22 791 579 n/a† 677 bytes
DH Düll et al. [10] Curve25519 13 900 397 17 710 bytes 494 bytes
DH This work KC 9 513 536 ≈ 9 490 bytes 99 bytes
S This work JC 9 968 127 ≈ 16 516 bytes 735 bytes
Table 5. Comparison of scalar multiplication routines on the AVR ATmega architec-
ture at the 128-bit security level. S denotes signature-compatible full scalar multipli-
cation; DH denotes Diffie–Hellman pseudo-scalar multiplication. The implementation
marked ∗ also contains a fixed-basepoint scalar multiplication routine, whereas the im-
plementation marked † does not report code size for the separated scalar multiplication.
Looking at Table 5, on the AVR ATmega architecture we reduce the cycle
count for Diffie–Hellman by about 32% compared with the current record [10],
again roughly halving the code size, and reducing stack usage by about 80%. The
Jacobian scalar multiplication needed for signatures, reduces the cycle count by
71% compared to [27], while increasing the stack usage by 25%.
Finally we can compare to the currently fastest full signature implementa-
tion [21], shown in Table 6.
Implementation Object Function Cycles Stack
Nascimento et al. [21] Ed25519 sig. gen. 19 047 706 1 473 bytes
Nascimento et al. [21] Ed25519 sig. ver. 30 776 942 1 226 bytes
This work JC sign 10 404 033 926 bytes
This work JC verify 16 240 510 992 bytes
Table 6. Comparison of a full signature scheme on the AVR ATmega architecture at
the 128-bit security level.
We see that we almost half the number of cycles, while also reducing the
stack usage by a decent margin. We do not compare code size, as this is not
reported in [21].
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